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TAIWAN’S WTO MEMBERSHIP AND ITS
INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Steve Charnovitz∗

ABSTRACT
In contrast to other international organizations, the World Trade
Organization does not require its members to be states. This
constitutional feature has allowed Taiwan to join the WTO alongside
China. As a result, the WTO is now the only major international
organization in which Taiwan can participate as a full member.
This article explores some implications of this unique situation
for Taiwan, for the WTO, and for international law. The article
contends that Taiwan’s membership in the WTO is not itself a
bilateral treaty with China and does not itself change the legal
relationship between Taiwan and China. What Taiwan’s membership
does do, however, is to establish some rule of law between Taiwan
and China and to give Taiwan standing in an international tribunal
should it wish to assert that China has violated WTO rules. The
parallel memberships of Taiwan and China also provide a neutral
international forum for those two governments to meet and
negotiate if needed. The article also points out some dangers to the
WTO that stem from Taiwan’s exclusion from international
standard-setting organizations. The article recommends that the
WTO do more to assist Taiwan in carrying out its WTO obligations
that involve the international community.
In joining the WTO, Taiwan has enhanced its sovereignty in the
∗
George Washington University Law School, Washington, D.C. A preliminary version of this study
was delivered at the “International Conference on the United Nations and Taiwan,” sponsored by the
New Century Institute in September 2003. This article is current as of July 31, 2006.
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modern sense of being able to participate in world governance. So
far, Taiwan’s membership in the WTO has not facilitated its quest for
a capacity to participate in the World Health Organization.
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accession; China; dispute settlement; Doha round;
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The fifth year of Taiwan’s membership in the World Trade Organization
(WTO) is an appropriate time to consider the implications of this special
status for the WTO, for Taiwan’s relationship with the People’s Republic of
China (“China”), and for international law. International trade has been
occurring regularly since antiquity and was one of the earliest areas for
economic regulation by governments. The building of the world trading
system culminating in the establishment of the WTO in 1995 is an important
achievement in international cooperation to supervise governmental trade
policies and other policies that affect trade. Because the scope of WTO law is
so broad within a globalizing world economy, the ability of a government to
join and participate in WTO decisionmaking is now more vital than ever.
The purpose of this article is to explore the implications of Taiwan’s
membership in the WTO. The WTO is now the only major international
organization (IO) that permits Taiwan to become a Member. Because most
commentators consider Taiwan to be a part of unitary China, Taiwan cannot
be and is not considered a “state,” and thus is not eligible for membership in
the United Nations (U.N.) or most other international organizations. Besides
the WTO, Taiwan is a Member of the Asian Development Bank, the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum, the Pacific Economic
Cooperation Council, and some other organizations noted below.
Nevertheless, WTO membership is Taiwan’s most important
achievement in revitalizing its status on the international plane. Being a
WTO Member will give Taiwan the same opportunities that other WTO
Members have. Yet Taiwan’s WTO membership also carries with it some
distinctive features that stem from Taiwan’s lack of international personality.
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The purpose of this article is to analyze these features, which heretofore have
been given little attention by commentators. Hundreds of articles have been
written about China and the WTO, but few about Taiwan and the WTO.
Taiwan’s WTO membership also has implications beyond the WTO. If
Taiwan can join the WTO, why not other international organizations that
purport to be world organizations, such as the World Health Organization
(WHO)? The answer is that Taiwan is not recognized as a state and this lack
of status is apparently more important than Taiwan’s interest in public health
and the world community’s interest in Taiwan’s activities regarding public
health. Yet the world community’s disassociational tendencies toward
Taiwan are in tension with Taiwan’s good standing in the WTO. This
anomalous situation is discussed further in this article.
The article proceeds in five parts: Following this brief Introduction, Part
II provides background information on Taiwan’s quest for WTO
membership. Part III describes the main developments regarding Taiwan’s
role in the WTO, and then analyzes some implications of Taiwan’s
membership for the WTO and for Taiwan’s bilateral relationship with China.
Part IV considers the implications of Taiwan’s WTO membership for
Taiwan’s status in international law and international organizations,
particularly the WHO. Part V concludes.
Because the nomenclature of “Taiwan” is politically controversial,
Taiwan goes by different names as a Member of various intergovernmental
organizations. In the WTO, Taiwan is called the “Separate Customs
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei)”. (Yet in
the short-name listings on the WTO website, Taiwan is called “Chinese
Taipei,” and is listed alphabetically as the first “T.”) In the Asian
Development Bank, Taiwan is called “Taipei China.” In APEC, Taiwan is
called “Chinese Taipei.” In the Asian Productivity Organization, Taiwan is
called the “Republic of China.” That is also the name for Taiwan in the
Afro-Asian Rural Development Organization and the Central American
Bank for Economic Integration. In the International Cotton Advisory
Committee, Taiwan is termed “China (Taiwan).” In the International Labour
Organization (ILO), the current practice is that if, in exceptional cases, there
is a need to mention Taiwan in an ILO document, then the reference should
be to “Taiwan, China.”1 In the OECD’s High-Level Group of Trade and
Industry Officials, Taiwan is referred to as “Chinese Taipei.” In this article,
Taiwan will be called “Taiwan.”

1

See http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ctry-ndx.htm.
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II. BACKGROUND ON TAIWAN IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
The saga of Taiwan’s participation in the world trade system began in
the late 1940s. The Republic of China was one of the original signatories of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), but the Nationalist
government withdrew in March 1950 in part because it could no longer
fulfill trade commitments of Mainland China. In 1965, Taiwan applied for
and received GATT observer status.2 Then in 1971, the GATT took away
Taiwan’s observer status after the People’s Republic of China was given
China’s seat in the United Nations, and Taiwan’s representatives were
expelled.3 This was one instance of the practice of the GATT to follow U.N.
decisions on high political matters.4
Taiwan began its odyssey to join the GATT in 1990.5 A working party
on Chinese Taipei was set up in 1992 and Taiwan became an observer.6 At
that time, the Chairman of the GATT Council stated that all parties had
agreed that there was only one China, and the Chairman then proposed that
Taiwan’s entry should not be finalized until after China’s entry. 7 That
sequencing was agreed to.
Because of that initial decision, Taiwan’s accession was delayed for 11
years until China’s accession could be negotiated.8 The details of China’s
accession proved very difficult to work out because China was asked to
accept special rules in its accession different from what was required by
normal WTO rules. 9 Taiwan was granted accession to the WTO on 11
2

James V. Feinerman, Taiwan and the GATT, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 39, 41 (1992).
Susanna Chan, Taiwan’s Application to the GATT: A New Urgency with the Conclusion of the
Uruguay Round, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 275, 278–79 (1994).
4
See WTO, GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 877 (1995).
5
Lori Fisler Damrosch, GATT Membership in a Changing World Order: Taiwan, China and the
Former Soviet Republics, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 19, 24 (1992); Sheryl WuDunn, Taiwan’s
Chances Rising for World Trade Status, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1991, § 1, at 21.
6
Lei Wang, Separate Customs Territory in GATT and Taiwan’s Request for GATT Membership,
25(5) J. WORLD TRADE, 5 (1991).
7
WTO, supra note 4, at 1017–18.
8
It is interesting to recall Lori Damrosch’s observation in 1992 that it would be irrational and legally
unwarranted to put Taiwan’s application to the GATT on hold if either economic or political reasons
might delay consideration of China’s entry for a prolonged period. See Damrosch, supra note 5, at
34, 37.
9
See Julia Ya Qin, “WTO-Plus” Obligations and Their Implications for the World Trade
Organization Legal System. An Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, 37(3) J. WORLD TRADE
483 (2003). See also Yang Guohua & Cheng Jin, The Process of China’s Accession to the WTO, 4 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 297 (2001). Even during the GATT era, there were some GATT-plus and
GATT-minus accession protocol provisions. For example, in 1967, Poland agreed to increase its
imports annually by seven percent (GATT-plus). See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM 287 (1st ed. 1992); Donald C. Clarke, GATT Membership for China?, 17 U. PUGET SOUND
L. REV. 517, 520 (1994). Poland (in 1967), Romania (1971), and Hungary (1973) agreed to accept
discriminatory safeguards against it (GATT-minus). See Robert E. Herzstein, China and the GATT:
Legal and Policy Issues Raised by China’s Participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 18 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 371, 397 (1986).
3
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November 2001, a day after similar action occurred with respect to China.
The effective date of Taiwan’s entry into the WTO was 1 January 2002,
which was 21 days after China’s entry.
The reason why the WTO was able to admit Taiwan, in spite of its
contested international legal status, is that membership in the WTO is not
contingent upon statehood. Almost all WTO Member countries are “states,”
yet WTO membership is available not only to states, but also to any
“separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its
external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in this
[WTO] Agreement . ”10 Taiwan entered into the WTO through accession as
a customs territory. Taiwan is apparently the only “customs territory” ever
admitted to the multilateral trading system (that is, from 1947 forward)
without direct sponsorship by a state exercising diplomatic relations for it.11
No judicial review in the WTO is available as to the determination of
whether an entity qualifies as a “separate customs territory possessing full
autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations.”12

Taiwan’s Accession Agreement
The most useful prism for examining an accession agreement identifies
“WTO-plus” and “WTO-minus” provisions. 13 WTO-plus provisions are
additional obligations applying to the acceded Member that do not apply to
incumbent WTO Members. For example, a requirement to implement a
provision of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (hereinafter “TRIPS”) immediately rather than on the
timetable that would apply to incumbent WTO Members constitutes a
WTO-plus provision. WTO-minus provisions are reduced obligations on
incumbent WTO Members with regard to the treatment they must apply to
the acceded Member. For example, a discriminatory safeguard against a new
entrant is a WTO-minus provision. Some analysts would characterize a
WTO-minus provision as a reduction in the “rights” of the joining Member,

10
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Art. XII:1, Apr. 15, 1994, in
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 7 (1999) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
11
In other words, the other customs territories that became GATT parties through accession did so
pursuant to GATT 1994 Art. XXVI:5(c) rather than the provision that Taiwan based its original
application on which was GATT 1994 Art. XXXIII. See Pasha L. Hsieh, Facing China: Taiwan’s
Status as a Separate Customs Territory in the World Trade Organization, 39(6) J. WORLD TRADE
1195, 1200 (2005). No separate customs territories entered the GATT 1994 under Article XXXIII.
12
The term “customs territory” is defined in GATT 1994 Art. XXIV:2. Part III of this paper takes
note of some incapacities by Taiwan that raise a question as to its eligibility to have been made a
WTO Member.
13
See Qin, supra note 9, for an articulation of the WTO-plus concept, but not the WTO-minus
concept.
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in contrast to a WTO-plus provision which is an increase in international
obligations. In this article, I do not use such “rights talk.”
WTO-plus and WTO-minus provisions are the product of a negotiation
ending in mutual agreement. The applicant consents to WTO-plus and
WTO-minus provisions as part of the price for joining the WTO. The
applicant remains free not to join the WTO, and so one might say that
nothing at all is imposed.
Such a view is unrealistic, however, and misses the “new sovereignty” in
international law.14 In the traditional view, sovereignty is autonomy, and so a
decision by a government to WTO-minus and WTO-plus provisions is an
exercise of its sovereign choice.15 In the modern view, sovereignty is the
legal capacity to belong to the international community and to participate in
IOs. From that perspective, when a government wants to join the WTO but
cannot, that government’s sovereignty is diminished. In order to gain that
sovereignty, a government may be willing to accept the imposition of
unequal and unfair membership conditions. But even though they are
accepted, such conditions are still being imposed.
Accession negotiations occur formally between the WTO and the
applicant government.16 The WTO Agreement states that accession occurs
on terms “to be agreed between it [the applicant] and the WTO.” Thus, an
accession negotiation results in a quasi-contractual agreement between the
WTO itself and the acceded Member. That agreement is a “Protocol” to the
WTO treaty and notionally is enforceable under WTO dispute settlement. So
far, no cases have occurred over the enforcement of Accession Protocol
provisions, but consultations are now ongoing against China regarding
accession commitments on auto parts.
Who is responsible for writing the provisions contained in an accession
agreement? Two views are possible.
One view emphasizes that although the WTO Agreement states that
decisions on accession are made by the Ministerial Conference through a
two-thirds vote,17 the actual practice is that the terms of an accession are
negotiated in a working party that uses consensus decision-making. Thus, a
government applying to the WTO cannot join until it gains the consent of all
WTO Members. (China was not yet a Member when the WTO approved
Taiwan’s accession.) As a result, accession agreements are an amalgam of
14

See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY 27 (1995)
(introducing these concepts); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked
World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283, 286 (2004) (discussing the work of CHAYES & CHAYES). For
a discussion of sovereignty-enhancing theory, see Kal Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate
in International Economic Law, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 841 (2003).
15
Another perspective is that a country can lose sovereignty when it is on the weak end of a
power-based negotiation.
16
See WTO Agreement, Art. XII:1.
17
Id. Art. XII:2.
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the results of the individual negotiations between interested WTO Members
and the applicant country.18 So from that perspective, one could say that the
terms of accession are the responsibility of the individual incumbent
Members.
The other view is that the WTO itself is the responsible entity for the
provisions in accession agreements. Thus, the WTO qua organization should
get the credit or blame for the WTO-plus and WTO-minus provisions in an
accession agreement.
Accession agreements are almost by definition unequal treaties. The
acceding country makes all (or nearly all) the commitments. The incumbent
WTO Members do not undertake new obligations (or only rarely do so).19 A
country joining the WTO cannot seek a WTO panel to challenge the fairness
of the accession agreement because WTO dispute settlement lacks any
judicial review of WTO Ministerial Conference decisions.
In addition to rule-based commitments, an accession agreement also
includes specific commitments on market access for goods and services.
Such commitments are neither WTO-plus nor WTO-minus because the
WTO does not require any particular level of market access. A government
seeking to join the WTO might be asked to provide more market access than
some incumbent WTO Members apply, but such “entry-fees” are a
traditional part of the trading system, and distinguishable from the new
WTO-plus and WTO-minus rule-based provisions.
A commitment to follow WTO rules is also not WTO-plus or
WTO-minus. Such a commitment is plain WTO. Although it would seem
redundant for an applying country to commit to follow WTO rules that it
would be obligated to follow anyway, such provisions are common in
accession negotiations, perhaps because they provide comfort to current
WTO governments. A commitment to enact a law (or regulation) required by
WTO rules or to repeal a law (or regulation) disallowed by WTO rules is also
not a WTO-plus provision, but rather an action taken to conform to WTO
rules. 20
In contrast to the WTO Protocol with China, the Protocol with Taiwan
has far fewer WTO-plus or WTO-minus provisions. 21 Taiwan’s market
accession commitments were substantial, however, and were developed
through 26 bilateral negotiations. For goods, Taiwan agreed to reduce its
18

See RAJ BHALA, MODERN GATT LAW 1117 (2005).
During the GATT era, there were a few accession protocols where incumbent contracting parties
made commitments to the new GATT entrant. See Gardner Patterson, The GATT: Categories,
Problems and Procedures of Membership, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 7, 14 (1992) (giving the
examples of Poland, Hungary and Romania vis-à-vis countries in the European Communities).
20
See the Conformity Clause in the WTO Agreement, Art. XVI:4.
21
See Working Party, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Separate Customs
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, ¶ 21, WT/ACC/TPKM/18 (Oct. 5, 2001). See also
Robin J. Winkler, Taiwan WTO Survey, 15 CHINA L. & PRACTICE 47 (2001).
19
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average tariffs from 6.0% to 4.15% for industrial goods and from 20.0% to
12.9% for agricultural goods. For services, for example, Taiwan agreed to
permit expanded foreign investment in telecom, and to permit foreign
insurance companies to sell more types of insurance.
Taiwan’s Protocol has some important applicant WTO-plus provisions.
In particular, Taiwan agreed to permit advertising for alcoholic beverages in
all media (subject to regulation on content and timing), to ensure
transparency in privatization, to apply TRIPS without recourse to the normal
transitional period, and to notify any new measures related to TRIPS to the
WTO at least 60 days before they are implemented.22 In addition, Taiwan
agreed to become a Member of the optional WTO Agreement on Trade in
Civil Aircraft and to seek accession to the optional Agreement on
Government Procurement.
Another specialized feature of Taiwan’s Accession is that the WTO
negotiated a Special Exchange Agreement with Taiwan on monetary issues.
Such action is provided for in the GATT article on Exchange Agreements
which provides that any WTO Member that is not a Member of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) shall become a Member of the Fund or
enter into a “Special Exchange Agreement” with the WTO.23 Because the
IMF has not permitted Taiwan to become a Member, Taiwan negotiated a
Special Exchange Agreement with the WTO as part of Accession.24 By its
terms, this Exchange Agreement is enforceable through WTO dispute
settlement.25
The Exchange Agreement is WTO-plus because it imposes a series of
disciplines on Taiwan regarding: economic and exchange policies, the
avoidance of restrictions on payments to current account, controls on capital
transfers, and restrictions on payments. These disciplines go well beyond
WTO rules and seemingly well beyond the general rules of the IMF. If so,
one wonders how this Special Exchange Agreement can be reconciled with
the requirement in GATT Article XV:7(b) that “The terms of any such
[Special Exchange] agreement shall not impose obligations on the
contracting party in exchange matters generally more restrictive than those
imposed by the Articles of Agreement on the International Monetary Fund

22

Id. ¶ 219. No such requirement is contained in Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Art. 63.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXT: THE RESULT OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 348 (1999) [hereinafter TRIPS].
23
GATT 1947 Art. XV:6. The GATT 1994 headnote ¶ 2(b) explains that the references to
CONTRACTING PARTIES are replaced by WTO.
24
WTO Doc., Special Exchange Agreement between the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan,
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu and the World Trade Organization, Annex II, in Accession Decision,
WT/L/433 (Nov. 23, 2001).
25
Id. Art. VI:4.
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on Members of the Fund.” Taiwan is the only new WTO Member that has
been asked to sign such an Exchange Agreement.
Because Taiwan is not a Member of the IMF, the Agreement provides
that whenever the WTO consults with the IMF on issues particularly
affecting Taiwan, the WTO shall take measures to “ensure effective
presentation” of Taiwan’s case to the Fund, including, without limitation, the
transmission to the Fund of any views communicated by Taiwan to the
WTO.26 This may give Taiwan, in a small way, an indirect channel into the
IMF, and in that sense, the provision enhances Taiwan’s sovereignty.
Finally, it is interesting to note that as with all WTO accession protocols,
Taiwan’s Protocol was to be registered in accordance with the provisions of
Article 102 of the U.N. Charter. That Article requires “Every treaty and
every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United
Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible
be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.” Of course, neither the
WTO nor Taiwan is a Member of the United Nations.

III. THE INFLUENCE OF TAIWAN’S MEMBERSHIP ON THE WTO AND
WORLD TRADE
This part addresses several interrelated topics: first, Taiwan’s
intellectual contribution to the Doha trade round; second, other important
contributions by Taiwan to ongoing WTO work; third, the special problems
in the world trade regime arising from Taiwan’s anomalous status; and fourth,
the implications of Taiwan’s WTO membership for Taiwan’s bilateral
relationship with China.

A. Taiwan and the Doha Round
The Government of Taiwan has been a constructive participant in the
ongoing WTO multilateral trade negotiations. Taiwan has issued several
proposals on key topics in the negotiations, some of which are discussed
below. On non-agricultural market access, Taiwan has taken the lead in
suggesting that newly-acceding Member governments be treated differently
in negotiations.27 Taiwan’s concern is that acceding countries have recently
made the greatest effort they could on trade liberalization. Asking them to
immediately liberalize again in the Doha Round is inappropriate, according
to Taiwan, because private enterprises in the acceding country have a
reasonable expectation of some continuity of trade policy for their business
decisions. Taiwan is not arguing that liberalization is bad for a country as a
26

Id. Art. VI:3.
See WTO Doc., TN/MA/W/19/Add.1 (May 16, 2003); see also WTO Doc., TN/MA/W19/Add.3
(July 8, 2003).
27

410

AJWH

[VOL. 1:401

whole; rather, the argument is that having extensively liberalized as part of
its WTO entry, a new Member government should not have to swallow a
second dose and thereby hurt its domestic industries. In services, Taiwan has
proposed a negotiating initiative on computer and related services and noted
that it could contribute to addressing the digital divide among countries.28
On regional trade agreements, Taiwan has offered a far-reaching proposal to
create a new discipline requiring that regional agreements on goods and/or
services contain an accession clause that would allow non-parties to join the
agreement under reasonable conditions.29 Such a clause could reduce the
discrimination inherent in a regional or bilateral agreement and move
countries in the direction of open regionalism. On countervailing duties,
Taiwan has proposed new rules regarding facts available, sunset, sampling,
and new shipper reviews.30 On antidumping, Taiwan has proposed new rules
de minimis margins, affiliated parties, and the definition of a domestic
industry.31
On dispute settlement transparency, Taiwan has adopted the line of other
Asian countries to oppose the U.S. and European initiatives for improving
transparency in WTO dispute settlement.32 The arguments Taiwan is making
for exclusion of nongovernmental views are similar to arguments made by
other governments. Yet the fact that Taiwan is making them is noteworthy
and surely sends a signal. As a new Member, Taiwan has no need to defend
the constitutional provisions in the WTO that inhibit transparency because
Taiwan did not participate in writing those rules. Nevertheless, Taiwan
argued against the U.S. proposal that calls for making public a government’s
submissions to a WTO panel. According to Taiwan, “taking the dispute
process into the public domain could lead to complications that get in the
way of an efficient settlement.” In addition, Taiwan has argued that the WTO
dispute mechanism was “never conceived as a public process.” In its
submissions, Taiwan has also opposed the European Community’s proposal
to permit unsolicited amicus curiae briefs. The reason offered by Taiwan is
that only some WTO Member countries have well developed social
resources such as think tanks. Thus, according to Taiwan, opening the
WTO’s doors to more information “would create a situation where those
Members with the least social resources could be put at a disadvantage.”
Taiwan, of course, does not lack trade-related social resources. At present,
Taiwan has at least two think tanks focusing on the WTO: the WTO
28

See WTO Doc., TN/S/W/10 (Jan. 8, 2003).
See WTO Doc., TN/RL/W/182 (June 9, 2005).
See WTO Doc., TN/RL/GEN/96 (Jan. 19, 2006).
31
See WTO Docs., TN/RL/GEN/62 (Sept. 16, 2005), TN/RL/GEN/68 (Oct. 13, 2005),
TN/RL/GEN/82 (Nov. 17, 2005).
32
See Dispute Settlement Body Special Session, Contribution by the Separate Customs Territory of
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu to the Doha Mandated Review of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU), TN/DS/W/25 (Nov. 27, 2002).
29
30
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Research Center at the National Taiwan University College of Law and the
Chung Hua Institution for Economic Research.
If any WTO Member should see the fallacy of rigid categories and
closed processes, surely Taiwan should. The fact that Taiwan is willing to
argue against fostering communication between the public and the WTO
shows its rapid inculcation of the WTO “club” mentality. Typically,
governments argue against briefs by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
on the grounds that such views should be communicated upward through
one’s own state. For obvious reasons, Taiwan does not parrot that
state-centric line. Instead, Taiwan premises its support for exclusion on the
assumption that some WTO Members have more “social resources” than
others. Obviously, this is true, but it is surprising that Taiwan leaps to the
conclusion that think tanks in Country A are going to support Country A in a
dispute. If this conclusion is wrong, then it would be possible that allowing
international nongovernmental social resources to be heard may somewhat
alleviate the current distortions of debate at the WTO in which the richer
countries have greater diplomatic resources.
On other dispute settlement matters, Taiwan has proposed several
thoughtful amendments to Dispute Settlement Understanding. 33 For
example, Taiwan proposed that third parties have greater access to
submissions of the parties to panels and the Appellate Body and that third
parties receive the panel report at the interim review stage. So on this issue,
Taiwan does see the benefit of transparency. Another Taiwanese
transparency proposal is to facilitate third party intervention of dispute
proceedings.
On trade and the environment, Taiwan has sided with those governments
advocating a broad interpretation of the negotiating mandate regarding the
relationship between WTO rules and specific trade obligations set out in
multilateral environmental agreements. In particular, Taiwan states that
specific trade obligations should include not only the obligations in a treaty
but also certain decisions made by the Conference of the Parties to an
agreement.34 This more inclusive view is appropriate, according to Taiwan,
because the mandate should cover “regimes with institutional function,
which engage in law-making process and create mandatory regulations
among their contracting parties.” Taiwan’s position is being welcomed by
the nongovernmental environmental community because Taiwan apparently
recognizes the more dynamic character of environmental governance as
compared to trade governance.
A related question that has come up in the course of negotiations is that
if the WTO is to provide some deference to environmental treaties, a method
is needed for determining which treaties qualify. Several conditions have
33
34

See WTO Doc., TN/DS/W/36 (Jan. 22, 2003).
See WTO Doc., TN/TE/W/36 (July 3, 2003).
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been proposed over the years including that a qualifying environmental
treaty would need to be open to all WTO Member governments.35 In its
submission to the WTO, Taiwan makes the cogent observation that a WTO
Member unable to participate in environmental treaties, then this condition
could end up excluding all those treaties from the intended WTO
deference.36 That is because Taiwan generally is not allowed to be a party to
or to participate in environmental treaties.
Taiwan has taken a constructive position regarding tariff elimination on
fishery products. 37 Taiwan notes that the economic value of liberalizing
international trade in fish might be dwarfed by the environmental
disadvantages from further depletion of fisheries stimulated by trade.
Taiwan does not argue that more trade will have that effect. Instead, Taiwan
offers a more nuanced point that there is a need to take into consideration the
full extent of environmental impact from higher levels of trade.38 Taiwan
points to a recent study by WWF which indicates that wild fish are the main
ingredient in fish feed used in aquaculture. Taiwan’s interest in WTO
environmental issues may stem from its relatively forward-looking
environmental policies.39
Note that all of Taiwan’s proposals discussed above are proposals that
Taiwan has made on its own. Taiwan has also joined other WTO Members,
such as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, the European Communities,
Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong China, Israel, Japan, Korea,
Liechtenstein, Mongolia, Namibia, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, the
Philippines, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, and the United
States in making joint negotiating proposals. Taken as a whole, Taiwan has
participated as fully as any other country in ongoing WTO negotiations and
has networked well.40

35
See generally Duncan Brack, Environmental Treaties and Trade: Multilateral Environmental
Agreements and the Multilateral Trading System, in TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE MILLENNIUM
321 (Gary P. Sampson & W. Bradnee Chambers eds., 2d ed. 2002).
36
See WTO Doc., TN/TE/W/11 (Oct. 3, 2002).
37
See WTO Doc., TN/MA/W19/Add. 2 (July 7, 2003).
38
For background on the issue itself in an Asian context, see René Vossenaar & Veena Jha,
Competitiveness: An Asian Perspective, in ASIAN DRAGONS AND GREEN TRADE 49 (Simon S.C. Tay
& Daniel C. Esty eds., 1996).
39
In 2006, Taiwan ranked 24 out of 133 countries in the annual Environmental Performance Index.
(Lower is better in this study.) Taiwan ranked just below Germany and Spain and just above Slovakia,
Chile, the Netherlands, and the United States. The full study is available at http://beta.sedac.ciesin.
columbia.edu/es/epi/downloads/2006EPI_Brochure.pdf.
40
For example, Taiwan is a Member of the informal WTO negotiating groups “Friends of Sectoral
Approaches,” Friends of Antidumping, and the G-10 group of food importing Members.
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B. Other Contributions by Taiwan to the WTO
Outside of formal Doha Round negotiations, Taiwan has been active on
several fronts in WTO governance. Taiwan proposed some improvements in
the fairness of WTO Accession processes with regard to government
procurement. 41 Its specific reform initiative states that Members of the
Agreement on Government Procurement shall not request WTO applicant
countries to make offers that exceed those of most of the existing parties to
the Agreement. Taiwan’s proposal also provides a time limit for parties to
respond to the offer of the applicant country. In the WTO negotiations on
trade in generic drugs, Taiwan agreed to join leading industrial countries in
opting out of using the system as an importer.42 In addition, Taiwan has
contributed over $730,000 to the Doha Development Agenda Global Trust
Fund.
In June 2006, Taiwan received its first Trade Policy Review at the WTO.
During the discussion WTO Members expressed concern that inbound
cross-strait trade was prohibited on some 2,000 tariff lines, and that little
inbound cross-strait investment had been allowed. 43 At the end of the
discussion, the chairperson said that “Chinese Taipei provides an excellent
model as a newly-acceded WTO Member.”44 At one point in the discussion,
China’s representative asked the representative from El Salvador to respect
WTO regulations after El Salvador referred to Taiwan as the “Republic of
China.”45
During its WTO Membership, Taiwan has been a steady participant in
WTO dispute settlement. Taiwan has been a third party in 15 cases in which
panel reports have been issued, four of them without China. Looking ahead,
it would certainly be possible to find Taiwan and China on opposite sides of
a dispute, or even for Taiwan to bring a case against China, or vice versa.46
In 2004, Taiwan joined the Advisory Center on WTO Law, which will
enhance Taiwan’s access to trade dispute settlement expertise.

41

See WTO Doc., GPA/W/224 (Nov. 20, 2002).
See The General Council Chairperson’s Statement, WTO News, Aug. 30, 2003, http://www.
wto.org/english/news_e/news03_e/trips_stat_28aug03_e.htm.
43
Concluding Remarks by the Chairperson, Trade Policy Review, Chinese Taipei (June 20 & 22,
2006), ¶ 5, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp266_crc_e.htm.
44
Id. ¶ 10.
45
This is based on a press report. Taiwan Trade Policy Review at WTO Draws to “Perfect End”,
BBC MONITORING, June 22, 2006. The minutes of the Trade Policy review remain a restricted WTO
document.
46
See Qingjiang Kong, Can the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism Resolve Trade Disputes
between China and Taiwan?, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 747 (2002).
42
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C. Looming Challenges for the WTO Relating to Taiwan’s Status
One challenge on the horizon regarding Taiwan’s WTO membership
involves the provisions of the WTO agreements relating to recognition of
international standard-setting organizations. These provisions are:
1. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) calls for
Members to use international standards as a basis for a government’s
technical regulations except when such international standards would be an
ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfillment of the legitimate
objectives pursued, and then defines international bodies to be bodies
“whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all [WTO]
Members.”47
2. The Agreement on Preshipment Inspection mandates the use of
international standards in some instances, and defines those standards as
those adopted by a governmental or nongovernmental body “whose
membership is open to all Members.”48
3. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) imposes a
discipline on the use of licensing and qualification requirements that impair
specific commitments, but lists as an adjudicative factor, the international
standards of relevant international organizations applied by that Member,
and then defines “relevant international organizations” to be bodies “whose
membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members of the
WTO.”49
4. The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS) lists three IOs that promulgate international standards under
the Agreement, and then notes that for matters not covered by those
organizations, international standards could include standards promulgated

47

See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Arts. 2.4, 2.6 & Annex 1, ¶ 4, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, in WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXT: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 122,123,138 (1999) [hereinafter TBT Agreement].
48
See Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, art. 2.4 & n.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE
LEGAL TEXT: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
202 (1999).
49
General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. VI:5 & n.3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE
LEGAL TEXT: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
292 (1999) [hereinafter GATS].
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by other relevant international organizations “open for Membership to all
Members,” as identified by the SPS Committee.50
All of these provisions are problematic for Taiwan and the WTO
because none of these organizations – named specifically or generally
referred to – is “open” to Taiwan. It would appear that the drafters of these
WTO provisions never contemplated the possibility that there would be a
WTO Member who is systematically excluded from most international
bodies. Even today, there is little recognition of the problem among WTO
Members. For example, at the WTO Trade Policy Review of Taiwan in June
2006, WTO Members called for further harmonization of Taiwan’s technical
standards and SPS arrangements with international ones.51
Eventually, the WTO will have to confront the implications of Taiwan’s
isolated legal status for the implementation of these four provisions. Taiwan
would appear to have leverage to keep international organizations from
being recognized under WTO provisions. One might call this the Taiwan
Exclusion Disqualification. For example, the Codex Alimentarius
Commission and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
could be denied recognition under the TBT Agreement. Such an action
would weaken these standard-setting mechanisms, and would also hurt the
WTO.
Under WTO rules, Taiwan has some important obligations with respect
to standard-setting IOs:
1. The SPS Agreement directs Members to take part in the Codex
Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of Epizootics, and the
International Plant Protection Convention and to promote WTO-prescribed
goals within those organizations.52
2. The TBT Agreement directs Members to play a full part in the
preparation by appropriate international standardizing bodies of standards
for products for which either they have adopted, or expect to adopt, technical
regulations.53

50
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Annex A, ¶ 3(d), Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, in WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXT: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 68 (1999) [hereinafter SPS Agreement]. The three listed
organizations are the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of Epizootics (now
World Organisation for Animal Health), and the International Plant Protection Convention. At this
time, Taiwan is not allowed to join these three organizations which have been inscribed into the SPS
Agreement despite their discrimination against Taiwan. Note that Taiwan is obligated to follow
standards set by these organizations even though Taiwan can have no role in drafting the standards.
51
Concluding Remarks by the Chairperson, supra note 43, ¶ 6.
52
SPS Agreement Art. 3.4. Recently, WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy stated that “WTO
Members have no choice but to be directly connected by the work of Codex!” Pascal Lamy, The
WTO in the Archipelago of Global Governance, Mar. 14, 2006, available at http://www.wto.org
/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl20_e.htm.
53
TBT Agreement, Art. 2.6.
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3. The GATS directs Members to “work in cooperation with relevant
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations toward the
establishment and adoption of common international standards and criteria
for recognition and common international standards for the practice of
relevant services trades and professions.”54 In addition, the GATS Annex on
Telecommunications directs Members to promote international standards on
inter-operability through the International Telecommunications Union and
the International Organization for Standardization.55
Currently, Taiwan would appear to be in default of all of these
provisions because it is not being allowed to participate in the international
organizations, bodies, and treaties named or referred to above. Thus, Taiwan
is vulnerable to dispute settlement claims being brought against it – even by
China, which is the country most insistent that Taiwan not be allowed to join
such international organizations.
In my view, the WTO should help Taiwan participate in these
organizations as required by WTO rules. In admitting Taiwan to be a
Member, the WTO understood Taiwan to be a customs territory that had
“full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the
other matters provided for in this Agreement. ”56 Yet Taiwan’s de facto
autonomy is less than full if the organizations that Taiwan is directed to
participate in by the WTO do not, in fact, allow Taiwan to do so.
Another challenge to Taiwan is that it has not been able to take part in
interparliamentary activities regarding the WTO. As many commentators
have pointed out, elected parliaments can make a valuable contribution to the
trading system.57 The most recent interparliamentary conference was held in
parallel to the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in December 2005. At that
conference, eight parliamentary delegates from China attended, but none
came from Taiwan.58 Legislators from Taiwan did not boycott the meeting.
Rather, they could not attend because they were not invited. Under the rules
of the Conference, eligible parliamentary participants have to come from: (1)
parliaments of sovereign States that are Members of the WTO, (2)
parliaments from non-WTO Member countries that are Members of the
Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), or from (3) listed parliamentary
assemblies, such as the European Parliament.59
54

GATS, Art. VII:5.
See GATS Annex on Telecommunications, ¶ 7(a).
56
WTO Agreement, Art. XII:1 (emphasis added).
57
See, e.g., Meinhard Hilf, How Can Parliamentary Participation in WTO Rule-Making and
Democratic Control Be Made More Effective? The European Context, in REFORMING THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM. LEGITIMACY, EFFICIENCY, AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 413 (Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann ed., 2005).
58
See List of Participants, http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/hk05/final_list.pdf.
59
Parliamentary Conference on the WTO, Rules of Procedure, Art. 2.1, available at http://www.
ipu.org/splz-e/trade04/rules.pdf.
55
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In my view, these rules for participation are objectionable because they
lead to overrepresentation of some countries. For example, an individual
living in France had four representatives at the Hong Kong Conference –
from the Parliament of France, the European Parliament, the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the Assemblée parlementaire de la
Francophonie – while an individual living in Taiwan had zero
representatives. To my knowledge, none of the organizers of the
Parliamentary Conference have offered any justification for such
discrimination.

D. Taiwan’s WTO Membership and the Bilateral China-Taiwan
Relationship
Taiwan’s membership in the WTO has led to mild tension with China in
Geneva. According to a press account, the Chinese Mission to the WTO
sends a complaining note to any government that calls Taiwan “Taiwan” in
WTO proceedings.60 A few years ago, China suggested that Taiwan should
change the name of its Mission to the WTO to match those of WTO
Members Hong Kong China and Macao China. Hong Kong’s Mission calls
itself the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, and Macao has a similar
designation. 61 Then WTO Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi
reportedly asked Taiwan to adhere to China’s request.62 Taiwan refused such
a name change.
In July 2005, China finally accepted the name that Taiwan had given its
Mission to the WTO which is the “Permanent Mission of the Separate
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu.”63 But China
continues to protest the use of diplomatic titles for most of the staff at
Taiwan’s Permanent Mission. Surprisingly, the WTO Secretariat has sided
with China and in 2005 removed those titles from the internal WTO
Members Directory. Taiwan has protested this discriminatory action by the
WTO Secretariat, but to no avail.64 Note that the WTO Agreement does not
provide any judicial review of administrative actions taken by the WTO
Secretariat.

60

Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Supachai Urges Members to Resolve Dispute Over Taiwan Titles, Daily
Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A33 (June 27, 2003).
61
Taiwan Defiant on Resisting Chinese Pressure for WTO Name Change, BBC MONITORING, May
27, 2003.
62
Pruzin, supra note 60.
63
C.H. Lu & P.C. Tang, China Finally Accepts Taiwan’s Designation Name to WTO, CENTRAL
NEWS AGENCY TAIWAN, July 22, 2005, http://times.hinet.net/news/20050722/English/5577281.
htm.
64
Sofia Wu, Taiwan Protests WTO Member Directory Changes, CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY TAIWAN,
Mar. 4, 2006.
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Although Taiwan agreed in its accession negotiations to seek
membership in the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, that
negotiation has stalled over opposition from China. China is concerned that
accession could give the implication that Taiwan’s government is not part of
China. This implication could arise from the listing of the specific
governmental entities that will abide by the Agreement. Ironically, China
itself is not a party to the Agreement, but apparently can still influence who
may join.65
Now that Taiwan is a Member of the WTO, its status there seems secure.
The WTO Agreement does not contain any provision for expelling or
disqualifying Member governments. Nevertheless, the trading system has
shown a continuing ability to improvise; so anything is possible.66 Should
Taiwan ever come under the political control of China, the question of
multiple votes might be raised. At this time, Macao China and Hong Kong
China get their own separate votes in the WTO.
Although some commentators have suggested that Taiwan and China’s
membership in the WTO puts them on the same par as each other, that does
not necessarily have implications for Taiwan and China’s bilateral
relationship. 67 After all, Hong Kong China and Macao China are also
Members of the WTO, and no one assumes that this status will change their
legal relationships with China. But given the history of animosity between
Taiwan and China, the fact that the two countries are now Members of the
world trade club could influence their mutual paths of legal socialization.
Some analysts have suggested that because the Agreement Establishing
the WTO is a multilateral treaty that it is conceptually decomposable into a
combination of all possible bilateral treaties among Members. With 149
WTO Members, that would be 11,026 bilaterals. In my view, this is a
misleading way to look at the WTO. The fact that China and Taiwan are both
Members of the WTO does not mean that they have a bilateral trade
agreement. Rather, they have both done the same thing; each has joined the
WTO.
Of course, in joining the WTO, both Taiwan and China chose not to
invoke Non-Application under Article XIII of the WTO Agreement. The
absence of Non-Application might be construed as “application,” but
65
Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Reach Agreement to Facilitate Taiwan Joining Government
Procurement Pact, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A4 (June 5, 2006).
66
For example, consider the example of Yugoslavia which had joined the GATT in 1966, but was
excluded from the GATT in 1993 following a change in government. The successor states Serbia and
Montenegro remain in line as candidates to join the WTO. By contrast, when non-GATT-party East
Germany was absorbed into West Germany, which was a huge economic change for world trade, the
GATT did not insist on a membership application from East Germany. In practice, East Germany
was more favored than Serbia in the accession process.
67
See John Shijian Mo, Settlement of Disputes between Mainland China and the Separate Customs
Territory of Taiwan within the WTO, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 145, 168 (2003) (“Being equal Members
with Mainland China does not change the fact that Taiwan is part of China.”).
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application is not the same thing as an explicit bilateral agreement. What
“application” means is that Taiwan and China agreed that WTO rules would
apply inter se just as they normally apply between all other pairs of WTO
Member countries. So Taiwan and China have legal obligations toward each
other as Members of the WTO but not through a treaty between them. Thus,
the fact that China and Taiwan are Members of the WTO does not mean that
China acknowledges Taiwan’s legal personality on the international plane.68
For Taiwan to join the WTO did not require China to sign any WTO
document. Taiwan became a Member of the WTO after the WTO approved
the Protocol of Accession with Taiwan, and then Taiwan signed (or
otherwise approved) the Protocol.69
Because the WTO Agreement imposes obligations on China with
respect to how it treats Taiwan and on Taiwan with respect to how it treats
China, the entry of both parties into the WTO has the potential for changing
their bilateral economic and political relationship. By permitting Taiwan to
join the WTO through accession, the WTO and its Members acknowledged
that Taiwan is a separate customs territory “possessing full autonomy in the
conduct of its external commercial relations and of the matters provided for”
in the WTO Agreement. Thus, it could be that WTO Member governments
are now estopped from denying that Taiwan possesses such autonomy.
When Taiwan’s accession to the WTO was approved, Taiwan’s
President Chen Shui-bian said, with regard to Taiwan and China, that “The
WTO offers a forum for both sides to interact in a multilateral context and try
to learn to live with each other under one roof, as competitors, business rivals,
or even partners.”70 So far, little induced harmony has seemingly occurred,
but the potential is always there for both governments to use the WTO forum
for communication.71
Taiwan has a number of trade restrictions against China that may violate
WTO rules and could be the basis of a dispute against Taiwan lodged by
China. The chief one is Taiwan’s discrimination against trade in Chinese
goods, trade in Chinese services involving investment-related commercial
presence and the movement of natural persons. These types of trade entail a
requirement for pre-approval.72 Direct commerce between Taiwan and the

68
Recall that countries or customs unions may join the WTO following a two-thirds vote by the
Ministerial Conference. WTO Agreement, Art. XII:2. Thus, the drafters of the WTO Agreement
assumed that a minority of WTO Members might oppose granting membership to a particular
applicant.
69
See Protocol of Accession of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and
Matsu, ¶ 9, WT/L/433 (Nov. 11, 2001).
70
Chris Rugaber, WTO Membership Could Improve Cross-Strait Ties, Taiwan Official Says, Int’l
Trade Rep. (BNA), at 2038 (Dec. 20, 2001).
71
See Josephine Wang-Ho, Taiwan and the GATT, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 61, 63 (1992); Chan,
supra note 3, at 292.
72
Hsieh, supra note 11, at 1213–16.
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Mainland was long prohibited by Taiwan but was slightly liberalized in July
2006.
So far, however, China has not brought a case against Taiwan,
apparently because doing so would acknowledge Taiwan’s separateness
from China.73 China has also showed an unwillingness to fulfill its own
requirements under WTO rules to notify Taiwan before initiating a safeguard
action against its trade or an antidumping investigation of goods from
Taiwan.74 Even so, Taiwan has not invoked WTO dispute settlement against
China. Recently, China accepted a visit by a Taiwanese government official
to conduct an antidumping investigation75 and agreed to talk with Taiwan
about a proposed import safeguard by Taiwan on towels.76
Perhaps the most significant potential effect of Taiwan’s WTO
membership is that it could invoke WTO dispute settlement should China
attempt to impose economic sanctions against Taiwan. The WTO dispute
system is the only international body that Taiwan would have access to as
Taiwan cannot lodge cases before the International Court of Justice or bring
a complaint to the U.N. Security Council.

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
Taiwan was able to join the WTO because membership is not restricted
to states, and so being a Member does not carry with it any implication about
statehood or independence and is not necessarily a way-station to statehood.
Still, there is one interesting historical example of a road from GATT/WTO
membership to statehood – Zimbabwe which, as the British Colony Southern
Rhodesia, was an original Member of the GATT in 1948. When Southern
Rhodesia became Zimbabwe, it nonetheless retained its GATT party status.
In 1980 when Zimbabwe joined the United Nations, Zimbabwe was at last
accepted as a state. To be sure, GATT membership was not a major cause of
Zimbabwe’s success.
Even though it is now a Member of the WTO, Taiwan is often
considered to be part of China. Nevertheless, given the high profile of the
WTO, and the fact that it is the only multilateral organization where both
China and Taiwan are Members, the WTO experience will invariably be
pointed to in a positive way by advocates of providing some official status
for Taiwan in other functional international organizations. Analysts have
suggested that the WTO experience shows the practicality of having both
Taiwan and China as Members enjoying equal rights and obligations.
73

Id. at 1217.
Id. at 1219–20.
75
David Lague, Trade Dispute Forces China to Talk with Taiwan, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Apr. 5,
2006, at 1; Taiwan Official Visits China for Anti-Dumping Probe, BBC MONITORING, July 4, 2006.
76
Taiwan, China Hold Talks at WTO on Towel Imports, BBC MONITORING, July 4, 2006.
74
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When Taiwan joined the WTO, there was a news story stating that based
on the “WTO formula,”77 Taiwan would seek to join other international
organizations in the future, such as the World Intellectual Property Rights
Organization (WIPO), the World Customs Organization, the ISO, and the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). So far
this has not happened.78 As Qingjiang Kong has pointed out, Taiwan has not
gained any significant new “diplomatic space” since its accession to the
WTO.79
Aside from a statehood requirement for membership, another
impediment against reusing the WTO formula is that in many international
organizations, there is apparently no formal status for Observers. Although
that status is not part of the GATT or WTO Agreement, observership has
been a long tradition of the trading system. That status made it easier for
Taiwan (and China) to join the WTO.
After Taiwan’s accession to the WTO was approved by the WTO
Ministerial Council in November 2001, the WTO Director-General of that
time, Mike Moore, declared that “With Chinese Taipei’s membership, the
WTO is taking another step towards achieving universal membership.”80
Moore seemed to be saying that the WTO would benefit from membership
universality. Unfortunately, that aspiration does not seem to be shared by
most international organizations.
Even in the less formal setting of transgovernmental cooperation,
Taiwan often cannot get into the door. For example, the Kimberley Process
Certification scheme for conflict diamonds will not allow Taiwan to be a
participating country. The Kimberley website, however, does note that
Chinese Taipei has met the minimum requirements.81

Taiwan’s Failed Quest to Join the WHO
Perhaps the most serious contradiction between an IO’s purpose and its
exclusionary membership policy is the WHO which not only has resisted
allowing Taiwan to rejoin, 82 but has also resisted an observer status for
Taiwan in the World Health Assembly and meaningful participation in
WHO programs. Taiwan has been seeking to gain observer status at the
77

Premier Explains Composition of WTO Team, CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY TAIWAN, Jan. 3, 2002,
http://th.gio.gov.tw/show.cfm?news_id=12755.
78
Taiwan has observer status in the OECD Competition Committee and the Steel Committee.
79
Qingjiang Kong, Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations: What are the Legitimate Expectations from the
WTO?, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 91, 96 n.18 (2004).
80
Press Release, WTO, WTO Ministerial Conference Approves Accession of Chinese Taipei (Nov.
11, 2001), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr253_e.htm.
81
See http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/?name=participants. The Kimberley Process was
granted a WTO waiver in February 2003 through a consensus that apparently included Taiwan.
82
Taiwan was expelled from the WHO in 1972.
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World Health Assembly for over a decade. At the most recent World Health
Assembly in May 2006, Taiwan again was prevented from attending, even
though it has voluntarily complied with the international health regulation
promulgated by the WHO. The WHO even refuses to issue press passes to
journalists from Taiwan.
Is there any basis for a legitimation of the WHO’s exclusionary practices
toward Taiwan? One might be that the WHO lacks authority in its
Constitution to open up to Taiwan.83 Taiwan cannot be a WHO Member
because it is not a state.84 Taiwan cannot be a WHO Associate Member
because it is responsible for its international relations.85 Taiwan is neither an
IO nor an NGO so it cannot have relations with the WHO under the relevant
provisions of the WHO Constitution.86 Although it is true that the World
Health Assembly, as an assembly, might be thought to have some implied
power of association beyond those specifically mentioned in the
Constitution, the narrow decision of the International Court of Justice in the
World Health Assembly Nuclear Weapons case might counsel against any
teleological interpretation of the Assembly’s competence.87
But this answer seems unsatisfactory for several reasons. One is that it is
inconsistent with WHO practice of giving “observer” status to several
entities whose legal personality does not fit WHO rules. Such entities
currently include: The Holy See, the Order of Malta, the International
Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies, and Palestine.88 Another reason is that Taiwan’s
exclusion is inconsistent with the functional public health mission of the
WHO and its claim to be a “world” organization. Article 1 of the WHO
Constitution states that the WHO’s objective “shall be the attainment by all
peoples of the highest level of health,” and it seems hard to reconcile that
aspiration with the exclusion of a country that has a population of 23 million
and is the world’s 17th largest economy. Moreover, Taiwan has been a
front-line country for public health risks such as SARS and avian flu.
83
If Taiwan is a non-State territorial entity, there is no such category of WHO membership or
observership.
84
See Constitution of the World Health Organization Art. 3, July 22, 1946, 14 UNTS 185. Taiwan is
currently recognized as a State by about 25 nations. Jonathan I. Charney & J.R.V. Prescott, Resolving
Cross-Border Relations Between China and Taiwan, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 453, 465 n. 88 (2000).
85
See Constitution of the World Health Organization, id. Art. 8 (providing associate membership
status for territories which are not responsible for the conduct of their international relations). Puerto
Rico is an Associate Member under this provision.
86
See id. Arts. 70, 71. Taiwan is a governmental organization. For a discussion of NGO contributions
to the WHO, see DAVID P. FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PUBLIC HEALTH: MATERIALS ON AND
ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL HEALTH JURISPRUDENCE 79 (2000).
87
See GIAN LUCA BURCI & CLAUDE-HENRI VIGNES, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 115–18
(2004) (discussing the Nuclear Weapons decision).
88
Id. at 36–38. See also U.S. Public Law 108–235, An Act to Address the Participation of Taiwan in
the World Health Organization, June 14, 2004, § 1(a)(8), available at http://www.access.gpo.
gov/nara/publaw/108publ.html.

2006]

TAIWAN’S WTO MEMBERSHIP & ITS INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

423

Diseases know no political boundaries, a point well recognized by the World
Medical Association which supports giving Taiwan observer status.89
That the trading system has always been open to non-state entities is not
accidental; the designers of the post World War II system recognized that its
functional mission would be furthered by not making membership
contingent on statehood.90 The drafters of the WHO Constitution did not
have that foresight, but this defect can be remedied by a constitutional
amendment. When the Convention on the Conservation and Management of
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean was
drafted in 2000, the drafters provided for participation in the Commission by
a “fishing entity.”91 Taiwan joined the Commission under that provision (as
Chinese Taipei) in 2004. This modality seems like a good prescription for
the WHO for how to amend its Constitution.
Short of a constitutional amendment, there might be other ways of
providing for ongoing interchanges between Taiwan and the WHO. For
information exchange itself, the WHO could simply name certain Taiwanese
officials as consultants. For transmitting Taiwan’s views to the WHO,
perhaps the WTO could serve as a conduit as it does between Taiwan and the
IMF. As noted above, an Annex to the Accession Agreement between the
WTO and Taiwan provides that the WTO “shall take measures . . . to ensure
effective presentation of Chinese Taipei’s case to the Fund, including,
without limitation, the transmission to the Fund of any views communicated
by Chinese Taipei to the WTO.”92 For the WTO to do that with the WHO
would require authorization, however, and getting that authorization would
be impossible without the consent of China.

V.

CONCLUSION

Taiwan is an anomaly in international relations. It is a self-governing,
stable, prosperous nation whose identity is sharply contested. It is an island
of democracy in a region where many states are not. Taiwan does not claim
to be a state, and yet often operates like one. It has joined the WTO, and
would like to be part of other IOs. Yet Taiwan’s future as a separate identity
89

Press Release, World Medical Association, World Medical Association Urges Taiwan’s
Acceptance to the WHO as an Observer (May 16, 2003). The World Medical Association was
founded in 1947 and succeeded a similar international NGO founded in 1926.
90
See Charter of the International Trade Organization, 1948, Art. 71, available at http://
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/prewto_legal_e.htm. See also Damrosch, supra note 5, at 38
(noting the “prescience” and pragmatism of GATT’s framers, and suggesting that other international
agreements and IOs can be expected to come under pressure for change when their membership is
based on formalistic legal constructs).
91
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western
and Central Pacific Ocean, Sept. 5, 2000, Art. 9.2, available at http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/entri
/texts/fish.west.cent.pac.2000.html.
92
Special Exchange Agreement, supra note 24, Art. VI:3.
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is doubtful. Taiwan faces, just 90 miles away, an increasingly powerful
China that yearns for eventual unification with Taiwan.
Against great odds, Taiwan finally succeeded in joining the WTO in late
2001. As with many new WTO Members, Taiwan had to make numerous
concessions in its accession accord, and yet more so than with any other
applicant, Taiwan’s entry into the WTO enhanced Taiwan’s sovereignty
when sovereignty is understood in its modern meaning. Joining the WTO did
not transform Taiwan into a state, but Taiwan gained greater economic and
political respect and perhaps a legal bridge to the future.
As a WTO Member, Taiwan may participate in writing and
administering world trade rules, and Taiwan is doing so with great relish. It
has been an active participant in Doha Round negotiations and has put
forward thoughtful and constructive proposals on regional trade agreements,
trade remedies, trade and environment, fishery trade, and the third-party role
in dispute settlement. In WTO operating committees, Taiwan has proposed
reforms for negotiations on government procurement, and has supported the
pharmaceutical companies in maintaining the value of their patents. In
dispute settlement, Taiwan has not yet been a litigating party (complaining
or defending), but it has been a third party in 12 cases.
Taiwan’s lack of membership in the United Nations has not yet led to
difficulties in the WTO, but may do so in the future because Taiwan cannot
participate in international standard-setting mechanisms whose standards are
the source of WTO obligations in the TBT, SPS, and GATS Agreements. A
key problem is that WTO rules generally require that qualifying
standard-setting mechanisms be “open” to all WTO Members. Because
organizations like the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International
Electrotechnical Commission, and the ISO are not open to Taiwan or
Taiwanese standards bodies, Taiwan could insist that standards of those
international organizations not form the basis of WTO obligations.93 So far,
Taiwan has not invoked this Taiwan Exclusion Disqualification.
Another problem is that because of the discrimination against it, Taiwan
cannot meet its obligations under the SPS, TBT, and GATS Agreements to
participate in international standard-setting mechanisms. This is a current,
not just theoretical, problem, and so the WTO should take action to promote
Taiwan’s effective participation in those organizations. One possibility
would be for the WTO to act as a conduit between Taiwan and the various
international standard-setting mechanisms through the WTO Committees
that regularly correspond with them.94
Taiwan and China are equal in both being Members of the WTO, but
that situation does not translate into a bilateral treaty between Taiwan and
93

This Disqualification would not apply to the three international standard-setting mechanisms
specifically denoted in the SPS Agreement. See supra note 50.
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See, e.g., SPS Agreement, Art. 12.3; GATS Agreement, art. XXVI; TRIPS Agreement, Art. 68.
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China. In other words, Taiwan’s relationship with China through the WTO
is the same as Hong Kong and Macao’s relationship with China through the
WTO. The relationship is one of membership parallelism.
Nevertheless, WTO membership does give a country important
procedural rights such as the ability to invoke WTO dispute settlement
against another WTO Member. In that regard, Taiwan’s membership in the
WTO does accord it with world legal status that it lacked before 2002.
Indeed, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only international
tribunal in which Taiwan has standing to insist upon the rule of law. From
that perspective, one can say that Taiwan’s WTO membership brings it
closer to China and gives both Members a neutral forum to discuss and
negotiate their mutual differences. Recently, as noted above, China and
Taiwan have undertaken bilateral consultations within the context of the
WTO.
That Taiwan’s status as a WTO Member is meaningful can be seen by
Chinese’s petty protests against Taiwan in Geneva on issues such as what
Taiwan is called and how its personnel are titled in the WTO phonebook.
That China would cavil is perhaps not surprising but what is surprising, and
disturbing, is that the WTO Secretariat is engaging in nomenclature
discrimination against Taiwan. Unfortunately, WTO dispute settlement does
not offer Taiwan any possibility for judicial review of this kowtowing by
WTO bureaucrats.
Although Taiwan was successful in joining the WTO, Taiwan has been
unsuccessful in joining the WHO, or even in gaining observer status in it.
The WHO may have a constitutional reason to deny Taiwan’s participation,
but its animus toward Taiwan seems to go beyond that, extending even to
journalists from Taiwan. Certainly if the WHO were predisposed toward a
less political approach to its world health mission, it could find a way to open
its doors to Taiwan.
This article has sought to take note of the very interesting development
in international law of Taiwan’s membership in the WTO. Examining
Taiwan’s membership offers a good window into how the WTO operates
and the possibilities for the peaceful evolution of Taiwan’s place in world
affairs.
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